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1 Introduction
This paper shows that in the presence of an increasing returns to scale contact technology and
labor mobility costs, the interaction between regional labor markets, in the forms of migration
and commuting, improves the match quality of high-skilled workers in the small region, how-
ever, it diminishes the match quality of low-skilled workers. The different impacts on high-
and low-skilled workers is a key new insight in this paper. To the best of our knowledge, the
effect of the spatial interaction between regional labor markets for heterogeneous workers has
not been documented in the literature.
The economic space is the outcome of a trade-off between various forms of increasing
returns to scale (either internal or external) and different types of mobility costs. Krug-
man (1980, 1991) emphasizes the interaction of firm-level increasing returns to scale and
transport costs, which creates an incentive for agents to locate near the large market and
thus produce agglomeration (see Fujita et al., 1999)1. In the field of urban economics, a
large body of literature has identified a number of sources of the external increasing returns
that produce agglomeration, for example, labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge
spillovers, suggested by Marshall (1890) (see review of Duranton and Puga, 2004; Rosenthal
and Strange, 2004). One interpretation of labor market pooling is that the larger and thicker
labor market can improve the quality of the match between firms and workers (Helsley and
Strange, 1990; Wheeler, 2001; Amiti and Pissarides, 2005; Andersson et al., 2007). This line
of research incorporates both worker and firm heterogeneity, which is stressed in recent pa-
1Krugman (1980) describes the relationship between increasing returns to scale (fixed cost of production)
and transport costs as follows: “In a world characterized both by increasing returns and by transportation
costs, there will obviously be an incentive to concentrate production of a good near its largest market, even if
there is some demand for the good elsewhere. The reason is simply that by concentrating production in one
place, one can realize the scale economies, while by locating near the larger market one minimizes transport
costs.”
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pers by Venables (2011) and Ottaviano (2011), and they often assume an increasing returns
to scale contact technology between workers and firms. However, the role of labor mobility
costs, i.e., commuting cost (migration cost) and lower efficiency of inter-regional job search,
has been far less researched. In this paper, we shed light on the interaction between increasing
returns to scale in job search and labor mobility costs. More specifically, we introduce labor
mobility costs into an assignment model with search frictions, two-sided heterogeneity and
free entry of vacancies in a multi-regional setting.
The model that we propose is an extension of Shimer and Smith (2000), which analyze
search frictions in an assignment model with heterogeneous workers and firms. The main
innovation of our theory is that we introduce the spatial interaction between regional labor
markets which is exposed to labor mobility costs into Shimer and Smith (2000). Regions
only differ in the size of the labor market, which is treated as exogenous. The two regions are
connected to each other by means of commuting and migration. Workers are free to search for
jobs in either or both regions and they are subject to two types of labor mobility costs if they
search jobs in the other region. First, because of the difficulties that workers face in gathering
information about jobs in the other region, an inter-regional job search is less efficient than an
intra-regional job search. Second, workers have to pay fixed commuting costs if they accept a
job in the other region. Workers optimally search for employment in two regions. The supply
of vacancies is determined by the free entry condition. Finally, workers are allowed to migrate
across regions in the model, which determines the regional skill distribution.
Under a contact technology which exhibits increasing returns to scale, workers expect to
have more contacts with firms per unit of time in larger regions and thus search is more
efficient. Given complementarities in production, the benefit of matching with firms with
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high productivity is greater for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers. Fixed costs
of migration and commuting ensure that, in the small region only high-skilled workers find it
profitable to migrate to the large region and median-skilled workers search jobs only in the
large region and commute to work if employment is found. However, low-skilled workers in the
small region continue to search jobs locally. Free entry of vacancies implies that more firms
will enter the large region and fewer firms will enter the small region, which leads to a decrease
in the contact rate for the remaining workers in the small region. Thus, high-skilled workers
benefit from the proximity to the large market because of the improved contact efficiency,
however, left-behind low-skilled workers lose from the proximity because of the deteriorated
contact efficiency in the local region.
Apart from the implications for the effect of spatial interaction between regional labor
markets on heterogeneous workers, our model yields implications for regional wage differentials
as well as the mechanisms that produce agglomeration. Since the job search is more efficient
in the large region, wages are higher in the large region for all worker types, which is consistent
with numerous empirical findings of the wage premium in large cities (see for example Glaeser
and Mare, 2001; Wheeler, 2001; Gould, 2007; Combes et al., 2008; Glaeser and Resseger, 2010).
The wage premium in the large region and labor mobility costs imply that high- (median-)
skilled workers migrate (commute) from the small region to the large region, which leads to
an increase in the number of firms in the large region and thus to further migration and
commuting. This process of circular causality - workers search jobs in the region where firms
concentrate, and firms tend to locate in a region with large labor market - leads to a further
concentration of economic activity. This mechanism is comparable to the process of circular
causality described in Krugman (1991). Consequently, disproportionately more skilled workers
4
tend to cluster in large regions (Bacolod et al., 2008; Venables, 2011).
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique Belgian linked employer-employee dataset
provided by the Crossroads Bank for Social Security in Belgium. Our measures of skill and
productivity derive directly from wages. The data confirm that the large local labor market
improves the quality of match for all worker types, especially for low-skilled workers. However,
the large neighboring labor market only improves the quality of match for high-skilled workers
but diminishes the quality of match for low-skilled workers.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, our model is an extension of
Shimer and Smith (2000), which introduce search frictions, see for example Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990), in the assignment model with two-sided heterogeneity
(for example Becker, 1973). Our findings are also related to the literature on the relation
between match quality and size of labor market. For example, assuming that search cost is
a decreasing function of the size of the market, Wheeler (2001) shows that the larger labor
market increases the strength of sorting. Moreover, we are not the first to study the job search
behavior in a multi-regional setting. Coulson et al. (2001) construct a search model involving
two regions to analyze spatial mismatch. Gautier and Teulings (2009) develop a search model
with costless migration and trade in a multi-regional setting. But the number of workers in a
region, which is determined by the stock of real estate, is treated as exogenous in their paper.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the theoretical model and
illustrates the equilibrium. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis and presents
some stylized facts. Section 4 provides the empirical strategy, and the results are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 General Structure
Figure 1 gives an overview of the general layout of the economy that we consider in this
paper. It is a continuous time economy with heterogeneous agents, complementarities in
production and search frictions. The economy consists of two regions which differ in the size
of labor market and we assume region A is larger than region B, LA > LB, which is treated
as exogenous2. Workers and firms can produce only in pair, and they are allocated to each
other via a random matching technology. This matching process is time-consuming and all
agents are infinitely lived and discount the future at a common rate r > 0. Under the contact
technology of workers and jobs with increasing returns to scale, workers (jobs) meet more
jobs (workers) per unit of time in the larger region which makes workers (jobs) more selective.
Workers in each region are free to search for jobs in either or both regions. Inter-regional job
search is subject to less efficiency of the contact technology and commuting costs. When a
worker meets with a job, she faces a trade off between accepting it or continuing to search for a
more suitable job. The optimal strategy is to accept the wage that exceeds a threshold value,
which is the reservation wage. For each worker, there is a reservation wage associated with
each region reflecting region-specific contact rate and commuting costs. Workers search jobs
in the region with the highest associated reservation wage. The number of firms (vacancies)
in each region is determined by a free entry condition. In the rest of this paper, firms, jobs
and vacancies are used interchangeably.
The two regions are related to each other by (1) inter-regional job search and commuting;
(2) labor migration. Both commuting and migration are costly. Workers living in region
2This can be extended to n regions.
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Figure 1: Regional Labor Markets
A have no incentive to search jobs in region B (or migrate to region B), as job search is
more efficient in region A. Because of complementarities in production, the benefit from an
improved match increases with worker types. Thus only high-skilled workers in region B find
it profitable to search jobs in region A and commute if employment is found. Low-skilled
workers in region B only search jobs locally.
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2.2 Assumptions
2.2.1 Production
There is a continuum of worker types s (skill) supplying one unit of labor and firm types p
(productivity) which are observable ex-ante, following log normal distribution.
logs ∼ N(µs, σs)
logp ∼ N(µp, σp)
The type density function for workers is l(s). The type density function for firms is g(p). Each
firm only has one vacancy to fill by hiring one worker. Entry in the production (job opening)
is costly. Each firm learns its productivity p only after making the irreversible investment fE
unit of output required for entry. We model this as a draw from a common distribution. The
supply of vacancies in the market is determined by a free entry condition. A worker of type
s and a firm of type p produce f(s, p) when matched and nothing otherwise. As in Lu and
Mc-Afee (1996) and Teulings and Gautier (2004), we assume that the production function
f(s, p) is supermodular with the following functional form3:
f(s, p) = sp
The marginal product of a worker increases the more productive the firm is. It implies that
the benefit of matching with firms of high productivity is greater for workers with high skills
than for those with low skills. In order to focus on labor markets, we implicitly assume that
3f(s, p) is supermodular if ∀s > s′ and ∀p > p′, the following condition holds: f(s, p) + f(s′, p′) > f(s, p′) +
f(s′, p). See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for discussions of supermodularity and forms of complementarities.
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goods markets are perfectly competitive.
2.2.2 Job-search technology
Each worker has a unit time endowment and is free to search for jobs in either or both regions.
Let ti(s) and 1− ti(s) denote the time a worker of type s in region i devotes to search jobs in
region i and j, respectively.
Contacts are random, i.e., unemployed workers contact vacancies at random. In order to
address the contact technology, we first introduce some notations. Let M(s, p) be the total
number of contacts between job seekers of type s and vacancies of type p. ui(s) denotes the
density of unemployed workers of type s per unit of labor supply Li in region i, hence
ui(s)
l(s)
is the unemployment rate for workers of type s. υi is the total number of vacancies per unit
of labor supply, while the total number of vacancies is υiLi. Then the density of vacancies of
type p per unit of labor supply is υi(p) = υig(p). Only firms with vacancies and unemployed
workers search. There is no on-the-job search.
Workers in region A can search either in region A with efficiency indicator 1 or in region B
with efficiency indicator ψ, 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1. Because the gathering information regarding available
job openings is more difficult across regions, inter-regional job search is less efficient than
intra-regional job search. Under a quadratic contact technology which exhibits increasing
returns to scale, the total numbers of contacts between job seekers of type s and vacancies of
type p in region A and B during a given time interval are:
MA(s, p) = µ
{
tA(s)uA(s)LA + ψ[1− tB(s)]uB(s)LB
}
υA(p)LA
MB(s, p) = µ
{
tB(s)uB(s)LB + ψ[1− tA(s)]uA(s)LA
}
υB(p)LB
(1)
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where µ measures the overall efficiency of the contacting process. The term tA(s)uA(s)LA +
ψ[1 − tB(s)]uB(s)LB is the effective number of workers searching jobs in region A, namely
tA(s)uA(s)LA unemployed workers in regionA searching jobs in regionA and [1−tB(s)]uB(s)LB
unemployed workers in region B searching jobs in region A, which are discounted by a fac-
tor ψ due to their lower search efficiency. υA(p)LA refers to the number of vacancies with
productivity p in region A. The parameter ψ in equation (1) measures the relative efficiency
of inter-regional job search relative to intra-regional search: ψ = 0 is the case without inter-
regional job search; ψ = 1 is the case that intra- and inter-regional job search are equally
efficient. If job information is assumed to decline with distance from opportunities, relative
searching efficiency strongly depends on the distance between two regions, with ψ′(d) < 04.
The underlying assumption here is that each worker’s residence is predetermined and workers
search for jobs from a given residential location. In Section 2.5, we will relax this assumption
and allow for migration, thus workers are able to choose their region of residence.
Quadratic contact technology, which avoids congestion effects between different worker
and job types, has been frequently used in the search literature. Teulings and Gautier (2004)
provide a number of motivations to understand why the quadratic technology is the most
appropriate assumption in a model with two-sided heterogeneity5. The technology refers to
the number of potential contacts between workers and firms, but not the number of realized
matches. Moreover, workers and firms become more choosy in the large region with greater
4Firms place help-wanted signs in their windows or place ads in local newspapers. Thus job seekers living
further away have less information on these jobs. Moreover, a large fraction of jobs are found through personal
referrals rather than formal contacts (Greenwald, 1986; Montgomery, 1991), which leads to the lower search
efficiency of workers living in another region who have less local social networks. Seater (1979) also shows that
workers’ searching further away from their residence are less productive in their search activities than those
who search closer to where they live.
5In the case of a contact technology that does not exhibit increasing returns to scale, an increase in the
number of unemployed hamburger flippers would impose a congestion on the unemployed rocket engineers
looking for appropriate jobs, which is unrealistic.
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efficiency of contact process, which partially cancels out the effect at the aggregate level
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2006). So the assumption of quadratic contact technology does
not contradict the empirical findings of constant returns to scale for realized matches at the
aggregate level (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for a survey).
Given the quadratic contact technology, the implied contact rates ρs→p for worker type s
to run into job type p (or ρp→s for job type p to run into worker type s) are:
ρiis→p = µti(s)υi(p)Li
ρiip→s = µti(s)ui(s)Li
ρijs→p = µψ[1− ti(s)]υj(p)Lj
ρijp→s = µψ[1− ti(s)]ui(s)Li
(2)
where the first subscript of ρ denotes the location of workers and the second subscript refers to
the location of firms. For example, ρABs→p denotes the contract rate for unemployed workers
s in region A to run into the vacancies p in region B. Equation system (2) suggest that the
contact rates are increasing in the size of labor market6.
Following Shimer and Smith (2000), we assume that matches between employers and
employees are destroyed randomly at an exogenous rate δ > 0, which is independent of the
location. When the match is destroyed, both workers and employers re-enter the pool of
searchers.
6In other words, workers in the larger region meet more jobs per unit of time.
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2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
Each agent maximizes her expected present value of payoffs. A steady-state (pure) strategy
for a worker s is a time-invariant set A(s) of firms with whom s is willing to match. The set
Ω(s) = {p|s ∈ A(p)} is an inverse set consisting of firms willing to match with the worker s.
A worker s’s matching set is ω(s) = A(s)
⋂
Ω(s), where a match (s, p) is mutually agreeable
if and only if p ∈ ω(s). So the matching sets are symmetric, p ∈ ω(s) if and only if s ∈ ω(p).
In steady state, the flow into the unmatched pool and the flow out must exactly bal-
ance for every type of worker. The density of matched (employed) workers in region A is
lA(s)−uA(s), and the matches exogenously dissolve with a constant flow probability (Poisson
rate) δ. The flow of matches created by unmatched workers of type s living in region A is
uA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
ρAAs→pdp+ uA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
ρABs→pdp, namely uA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
ρAAs→pdp matches in
region A and uA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
ρABs→pdp matches in region B. In steady state, for all worker
types s in region A, we have:
δ(lA(s)− uA(s)) = uA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
ρAAs→pdp+ uA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
ρABs→pdp
= µtA(s)LAuA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
υA(p)dp+ ψµ[1− tA(s)]LBuA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
υB(p)dp
(3)
The left-hand side of equation (3) is the outflow of workers from the matched pool. The
right-hand side of equation (3) refers to the inflow of workers that find jobs in region A and
region B.
Let Ui(s) denote the expected value of an unemployed worker s in region i, i = A,B.
Similarly, let Wij(s|p) be the present value for a worker s in region i while matched with a
firm p in region j, i, j = A,B. And Sij(s|p) = Wij(s|p)− Ui(s) is her personal surplus when
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matched.
While unmatched, a worker s in region A gets unemployment benefit UB7, but at flow
rate µtA(s)LA
∫
ωAA(s)
υA(p)dp she meets and matches with some p ∈ ωAA(s) in region A
and enjoys a gain SAA(s|p), and at flow rate ψµ(1− tA(s))LB
∫
ωAB(s)
υB(p)dp she meets and
matches with some p ∈ ωAB(s) in region B and enjoys a gain SAB(s|p). The value of being
unmatched for a worker s in region A is generated by the Bellman equation:
rUA(s) = UB + max
tA(s)∈[0,1]
{
tA(s)µLA
∫
ωAA(s)
SAA(s|p)υA(p)dp
+ [1− tA(s)]ψµLB
∫
ωAB(s)
SAB(s|p)υB(p)dp
}
(4)
Workers use their time endowment optimally to search for employment in two regions.
Although unemployed workers are free to use their one unit time endowment to search for
employment in either or both regions, obviously, search time is completely specialized, i.e.,
tA(s) ∈ {0, 1}. In other words, a worker s living in region i only search jobs in region i if the
value of being unmatched when searching for employment in region i is greater than or equal
to the value of being unmatched when searching for employment in region j.
tA(s) =

1 if µLA
∫
ωAA(s)
SAA(s|p)υA(p)dp ≥ ψµLB
∫
ωAB(s)
SAB(s|p)υB(p)dp
0 otherwise
(5)
The value of a vacancy with productivity p, likewise, can be written as follows:
rVA(p) = µLA
∫
ωAA(p)
tA(s)SAA(p|s)uA(s)ds+ψµLB
∫
ωBA(p)
(1− tB(s))SBA(p|s)uB(s)ds (6)
7UB may also reflect the value of leisure and home production.
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At flow rate µLA
∫
ωAA(p)
tA(s)uA(s)ds a firm p in region A meets and matches with some
s ∈ ωAA(p) from region A and enjoys a gain SAA(p|s), and at flow rate ψµLB
∫
ωBA(p)
(1 −
tB(s))uB(s)ds the firm meets and matches with some s ∈ ωBA(p) from region B and enjoys
a gain SBA(p|s).
Prior to entry, the expected net value of a vacancy in region A is VA − fE . If this net
value is negative, no firms would enter the market. The expected net value is driven to zero
by the unrestricted entry of new vacancies. This yields the equilibrium free entry condition.
rVA = r
∫
VA(p)g(p)dp = rfE (7)
While matched, a worker s in region i gets the payoff piij(s|p) when she matched with a
firm p in region j and we have the resource constraint piij(s|p) + piij(p|s) ≡ f(s, p). With rate
δ, her match is destroyed and she suffers a loss Sij(s|p). Then the value of a match for a
worker s in region i with a firm p in region i is:
rWii(s|p) = piii(s|p)− δSii(s|p) (8)
Workers living in region i have to pay the commuting cost (transportation cost, commuting
time) when they accept a job in region j. So the value of a match for a worker s in region i
with a firm p in region j is:
rWij(s|p) = piij(s|p)− TC − δSij(s|p) (9)
where TC is the commuting cost a worker has to pay for every period, depending on the
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distance between two regions, TC ′(d) > 0. In other words, it is costless for workers to
commute within their own labor market, but it is costly to commute from one location to
another.
While matched, wages are set by a simple Nash bargaining as in Pissarides (1990) with
θ being worker’s bargaining power, 0 < θ < 1. From the first order condition, we have
(1 − θ)[Wij(s|p) − Ui(s)] = θ[Jij(p|s) − Vj(p)], where Jij(p|s) is the present value for a firm
p in region j while matched with a worker s from region i. Using (8), (9) and the resource
constraint, we obtain the surplus of workers and firms:
Sii(s|p) = θ
[
f(s, p)− rUi(s)− rVi(p)
r + δ
]
Sii(p|s) = (1− θ)
[
f(s, p)− rUi(s)− rVi(p)
r + δ
]
Sij(s|p) = θ
[
f(s, p)− rUi(s)− rVj(p)− TC
r + δ
]
Sij(p|s) = (1− θ)
[
f(s, p)− rUi(s)− rVj(p)− TC
r + δ
]
.
(10)
where rUi(s) = wi(s) is the average present value of an unmatched worker s in region i, i.e.,
reservation wage, rVi(p) = wi(p) is the average present value of an unmatched vacancy p in
region i. Personal surplus is a share, reflecting her bargaining power, of the excess of matching
output over both unmatched values and the commuting cost if it is a cross-regional match.
Discount rate accounts for interest rate and matching destroy rate.
In equilibrium, a worker / firm’s strategy is to accept any match that weakly exceeds her
expected present unmatched value: Sij(s|p) ≥ 0 if and only if p ∈ A(s). Thus, the matching
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sets are
SAA(s, p) = f(s, p)− wA(s)− wA(p) ≥ 0⇔ p ∈ ωAA(s)⇔ s ∈ ωAA(p)
SAB(s, p) = f(s, p)− wA(s)− wB(p)− TC ≥ 0⇔ p ∈ ωAB(s)⇔ s ∈ ωAB(p)
(11)
Substituting (10) into (4), we obtain the value function of an unemployed worker of type
s and the value function of an unmatched job p:
wA(s) =UB + max
tA(s)∈0,1
{
tA(s)θ
µLA
(r + δ)
∫
ωAA(s)
[f(s, p)− wA(s)− wA(p)]υA(p)dp+
[1− tA(s)]θ ψµLB
(r + δ)
∫
ωAB(s)
[f(s, p)− wA(s)− wB(p)− TC]υB(p)dp
}
wA(p) =(1− θ) µLA
(r + δ)
∫
ωAA(p)
[f(s, p)− wA(s)− wA(p)]tA(s)uA(s)ds+
(1− θ) ψµLB
(r + δ)
∫
ωBA(p)
[f(s, p)− wB(s)− wA(p)− TC][1− tB(s)]uB(s)ds
(12)
In the first equation of (12), the second term on the right-hand side is the expected value
of the worker’s share of match surplus in region A and the third term is the expected value
of the worker’s share of match surplus in region B. Equation (12) implies that in equilibrium
the expected surplus of matching is equal to the opportunity time cost of search.
A search equilibrium is characterized as a quadruple (w, V, ω, u), where w solves the value
equation system (12) given (ω, u, υ); V sloves the free entry condition (7) given (ω,w, u), ω is
matching set given w based on (11); and u solves the steady state equation (3) given (ω, υ).
It is impossible to solve the model analytically because the wage function w(x) is not
available8. Therefore, we have to solve the model numerically9. The results of this numerical
8Shimer and Smith (2000) have a proof of the existence of the equilibrium. Teulings and Gautier (2004)
apply a second-order Taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium.
9First, we divide the type space into 300 discrete types. Second, we guess initial values for all endogenous
objects, and then take the following steps: (i) calculate the associated steady state unemployment rates using
(3), calculate the value function using (12) and then calculate a new matching set using (11); (ii) repeat process
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solution are presented in the next section.
2.4 Illustration of the Equilibrium
We assume that both the worker type s and firm type p follow log normal distribution on
the interval [1, 4]10. The other parameters in the model are set as follows: discount rate r is
normalized to 1, exogenous destroy rate δ = 2r, size of labor market LA = 10LB = 5000r,
bargaining power of workers θ = 0.5, commuting cost TC = 0.4, unemployment benefit
UB = 0.4 and sunk entry cost fE = 1.8.
In the frictionless matching model with complementarities, workers and jobs end up with
the optimal match. When search is costly, we can no longer expect perfect assortative match-
ing, because workers/firms will widen the set of partners that they will accept in order to save
on search cost. In this section we firstly discuss the case without inter-regional job search,
i.e., ψ = 0, and then analyze the results allowing for inter-regional job search with different
efficiency indicator ψ (or different commuting costs TC) and different size of the large region.
2.4.1 No Inter-regional Job Search
The contact rate is higher in region A which suggests that workers and firms expect to have
more contacts per unit of time. Because the expected value of continued search is higher in
region A, workers and firms are more selective, indicating that the matching set is narrower
in region A than that in region B. The first panel in Figure 2 illustrates the matching sets of
workers and firms in both regions. The lighter shaded area denotes the matching set in region
(i) until the matching set does not change; (iii) calculate the expected firm profit using (7). If it is larger than
the sunk entry cost of a vacancy, we increase the number of vacancy openings in the market and repeat (i),
(ii) and (iii) until the expected value of vacancies converge to the sunk entry cost. The program is available
upon request.
10We choose the mean 0.693 and standard deviation 0.27 to make sure that 95% of the values drawn from
the log normal distribution lie in the range of [1, 4].
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A and the whole (lighter and darker) shaded area is the matching set in region B. The upward
sloping bands are a direct consequence of the equilibrium with positive assortative matching:
the low types are rejected by the high types. And as shown in Figure 2(A), in equilibrium
the interval of types that workers / firms are willing to match is remarkably larger in region
B. The upper right panel shows the reservation wage of workers in region A and B, both of
which are convex reflecting the nature of the production technology. The reservation wage
is higher in the large region for every skill type since the expected value of search is higher,
and the inter-regional reservation wage difference of the same worker type increases with skill
levels 11. It implies that high-skilled workers gain more from an improved match, which is
crucial for the self-selection of high-skilled workers to the large region when inter-regional
job search is allowed for. The bottom left panel presents the values of vacancies in region
A and B. For the firms with low productivity, the expected value of a vacancy is higher in
the small region since relatively high-skilled workers would also accept the matching due to
the low contact rate. However, for the firms with high productivity, the expected value is
higher in the large region because of the higher probability to contact with proper partners.
The bottom right panel illustrates the unemployment rate by worker types in both regions.
Low-skilled workers have a much higher unemployment rate since they are rejected by high
productivity firms. The unemployment rate increases for the very high types because the
high-skilled workers prefer not to match with low productivity firms in order to assure a good
match. The unemployment rate is lower in the large region because of the higher contact rate.
And the difference in inter-regional unemployment rates is smaller for high-skilled workers.
11This is the result of the production function with complementarities. If the production function is f(s, p) =
s+ p, an improved match is equally valuable for workers with different skills.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium without inter-regional job Search ψ = 0
2.4.2 Inter-regional Job Search with Different Relative Search Efficiency
In this section, the inter-regional job search between region A and B is allowed for. Workers
optimally allocate their unit time endowment by comparing the values of being unemployed
when searching for jobs in two regions (see equation (5)). As search is more efficient in region
A, only residents in region B have incentives to search jobs in region A. As the benefit
of matching with firms of high productivity is greater for high-skilled workers than for low-
skilled workers, moreover, inter-regional job search is less efficient than intra-regional job
search (ψ ≤ 1) and workers have to pay commuting costs when employment is found in other
region, only high-skilled workers living in the small region find it profitable to search jobs in
the large region and commute to work if they are employed. Nevertheless, low-skilled workers
find that the increased value of being unemployed by searching jobs in the large region cannot
compensate for the commuting cost. So low-skilled workers in the small region only search
jobs locally. In particular, workers with skills above the cutoff level s∗c (see Figure 3(B)) in
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Figure 3: Equilibrium with inter-regional job Search ψ = 0.4
region B only search jobs in region A. However, workers with skills below the cutoff level in
region B search for jobs locally. Since more high-skilled workers search for jobs in region A,
firms, especially high productivity firms in region A become more selective in which way the
strength of matching in region A is slightly improved. Because the remaining workers who
search for jobs in the small region are low- and medium-skilled, firms widen the set of workers
that they accept and thus the value of vacancies with high productivity decreases in the small
region. The free entry condition implies that job (vacancy) openings decrease dramatically in
the small region. Figure 4 shows that the vacancy density decreases in the small region when
the inter-regional job search is allowed, while the vacancy density increases slightly in the
large region because of the inflow of high-skilled workers from the small region. As shown in
Figure 3(D), the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers in region B increases remarkably
when inter-regional job search is allowed for. While the unemployment rate of high-skilled
workers (above s∗c) decreases in region B.
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Figure 4: Vacancy Density in Region A and B
We change the inter-regional job search efficiency indicator ψ from 0.34 to 0.4 to see the
change of matching set, reservation wage/vacancy value and unemployment rate in A and B,
respectively12. Figure 5 illustrates the reservation wage in the small region for different inter-
regional search efficiency indicators. When the inter-regional job search efficiency indicator
increases from 0.34 to 0.4, the cutoff skill level for commuters shifts leftwards suggesting
that more workers living in region B afford to search jobs in region A. High-skilled workers
who are able to commute, benefit from the high contact rate in the large region and thus
have higher reservation wage compared to the situation with lower inter-regional job search
efficiency. However, the commuting of high-skilled workers from the small region to the large
region leads to a drop in the vacancy openings in the small region which diminishes the local
contact rate. Thus, the reservation wage of low-skilled workers decreases as the inter-regional
job search efficiency increases (or the improvement of commuting technology).
The results suggest that when taking account of the spatial interactions between regional
12For example, government carries out some policies aiming to improve the inter-regional job search efficiency.
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Figure 5: Reservation Wage in Region B for different inter-regional Search efficiency ψ
labor market the outcomes of regional labor market depends not only on the size of local labor
market but also on the size of labor market in neighboring areas. If the inter-regional job
search efficiency ψ and commuting costs TC depend on the distance between regions, high-
skilled workers in the small region are better off by being close to the large market, however,
low-skilled workers are worse off by being close to the large market.
2.4.3 Inter-regional Job Search with Different Size of the Large Region
In this section, we change the size of the large region. In particular, we increase the relative
size of the large region from LA = 8LB to LA = 10LB. Similarly, the cutoff skill level for
commuters shifts leftwards suggesting that more workers in the small region commute if it
has larger neighboring areas. High-skilled workers in region B have higher reservation wage
if the relative size of region A increases. However, low-skilled workers have lower reservation
wage if the relative size of the large region increases.
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2.5 Extension: Worker Migration
Up to this point workers are exogenously domiciled in a given region but can commute between
locations. In this section, we relax this assumption by allowing for the worker migration across
regions, which endogenizes the regional skill distribution. Let us label workers by their initial
residence in region i and denote the cost of moving from B to A by Cm > 0 (residents in region
A have no incentive to move to region B since the reservation wage is higher for every skill
type in region A than that in region B, which allows us to focus exclusively on the behavior
of residents in region B). Migration cost Cm is assumed to be larger than the present value
of commuting cost13. Particularly, Cm is set to be 0.8 in the simulation. Workers continue
to migrate till the inter-regional gap of the value of being unemployed for s-type is equal to
migration cost.
The migration equilibrium condition for residents in region B is:
WA(s)−WB(s) = Cm (13)
That is, the incremental value of a mover net of migration cost must be zero in equilibrium.
The upper right panel in Figure 6 illustrates the cutoffs for migration and commuting. Because
the increase in the expected value from moving increases with worker types, only very high-
skilled workers (above s∗m) in region B migrate to region A. Medium-skilled workers (in the
range of (s∗c , s∗m)) in region B only search jobs in region A and commute to work if employment
is found. Low-skilled workers (below s∗c) only search jobs in the small region.
Figure 7 shows the skill distribution in both regions. Region A has disproportionately
13Migration cost can be interpreted as the house prices gap between the big city and the small town. For
simplicity, we assume this gap is exogenously given.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium: Migration with ψ = 0.4
more high-skilled workers. This is consistent with the fact that workers with higher-skills
tend to agglomerate in the larger, denser and more skilled labor market (Combes et al., 2008;
Bacolod et al., 2008).
Our paper yields a number of testable implications for the commuting behavior, the
strength of assortative matching across regions, and the regional skill distribution. Below,
we summarize the model’s main implications. Labor mobility costs, namely commuting cost,
discounted inter-regional job search efficiency and migration cost, lead to a selection of high-
skilled workers to big cities by either commuting or migration. Because of the outflow of
high-skilled workers from the small towns to the large cities, job (vacancy) openings have
a dramatic decrease in small towns. Consequently, workers and firms are less choosy which
suggests that the strength of matching for remaining workers in small towns is deteriorated.
So high-skilled workers in small towns benefit from being close to large cities, however, low-
skilled workers in small towns suffer from being close to large cities. When migration is al-
lowed, workers with sufficiently high skills migrate to large cities. The medium-skilled workers
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Figure 7: Skill distribution in Region A and B
only search jobs in large cities and commute if employment is found. Thus, large cities host
disproportionately more high-skilled workers.
3 Data
3.1 Data Description
A unique Belgian linked employer-employee dataset (LEED) is used to test the main impli-
cations of the model. This dataset is collected by the Crossroads Bank for Social Security
in Belgium, an organization specialized in combining data on Belgian workers from different
administrative sources, such as the Belgian employment agencies and the National Social Se-
curity Office. The data covers nearly the whole Belgian population and initially consists of
35,721,027 observations, with each observation corresponding to a worker-firm-year combina-
tion. The dataset covers 11 years, ranging from 1998 to 2008. At the individual worker level
the data provide information on age, gender, gross daily wage (full time equivalent), location
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of residence and workplace, labor market status, and an indicator of whether a worker is a
full- or part-time worker. At the firm level, the data contains the information on firm location,
number of employees, the industry in which the firm operates and an indicator of whether a
firm is a single- or multi-plant firm. Firm’s as well as worker’s location are reported at the
municipality level. Municipalities are the smallest administrative regions in Belgium of which
there are a total of 589. This high level of geographical disaggregation in the data allows us to
construct detailed measures of labor market size. One limitation of the data is that there are
no direct links between workers and establishments, but only between workers and firms14.
However, the single-plant indicator allows us to use only single-plant firms as a robustness
check in this paper.
Since in Belgium the minimum mandatory schooling age is 18 and the official mandatory
retirement age is 64, we remove workers with an age smaller than 18 or higher than 64 from
the sample. In case a worker has multiple jobs at the same time, only the primary job (paying
the highest wage) is kept. Workers with a wage below the 1st or above the 99th percentile of
the wage distribution are dropped. Workers who earn less than a minimum wage are dropped.
Workers working in public sectors, education and health sectors are dropped, because their
wage is heavily regulated (See Appendix A for a detailed description of the dataset and
cleaning process). Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the sample.
3.2 Some Stylized Facts
Regions differ in the size of labor market and thus the efficiency of job search, which lead
to wage disparities across regions. Figure 8 shows a clear positive relationship between a
region’s average wage and its size, measured in terms of working population. This confirms
14The dataset only provide worker-establishment information in 2007 and 2008.
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Figure 8: Average Wage and Size of Labor Market (2000)(slope=0.025, s.e.=0.0034)
the commonly reported stylized facts that the average wage is higher in large cities.
The spatial interactions between regional labor markets are intensive in Belgium. Figure
9 shows the average commuting rate and migration rate at municipality level. A commuter is
defined as a worker who works in a municipality which is different from the one where she lives.
The average commuting rate is calculated as the ratio of the total number of commuters over
the total number of workers. A migrant refers to a worker who changes her place of residence
across time period. The average migration rate is the ratio of the total number of migrants
over the total number of workers. The average commuting rate stably increased from 80.31%
to 81.68% in Belgium during the period 1998-2008. In contrast, the average migration rate
in Belgium is rather low, around 6.0%. So we mainly focus on the commuting behavior in
Belgium in the remainder of the paper.
The model implies that high-skilled workers are more likely to commute to large cities.
Figure 10 provides strong evidence for it. The average commuting rate is higher for workers
with higher skills measured by their average wage. The average commuting rate is 67% for
workers with the average wage below the 10th percentile while it is up to 90% for workers
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Figure 9: Average Commuting Rate and Migration Rate in Belgium
Figure 10: Commuting Rate and Worker Types
above 90th percentile of average wage distribution.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Measuring the Strength of Matching
In order to construct the strength of matching, we need to measure the quality of workers and
firms. The most commonly used methodology applied to a linked employer-employee data is
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the linear wage decomposition proposed by Abowd et al. (1999)(AKM henceforth).
logwit = xitβ + θi + ψJ(i,t) + it (14)
where wit denotes the wage of worker i at time t, xit are time-varying observed characteristics
of worker i, θi is a worker fixed effect, ψJ(i,t) is a firm fixed effect and it is a residual and is
assumed to be orthogonal to the explanatory variables in equation (14). The parameters β,
θi and ψj are estimated using the iterative conjugate gradient algorithm described in Abowd
et al. (2002). The correlation between worker and firm effect Corr(θ̂, ψ̂) measures the strength
of matching. Using AKM method, several empirical studies find an insignificant or even
negative correlation in fixed effects between worker and firm types in France, US, Denmark
and Brazil. The results suggest that there is little sorting in labor market. However, Eeckhout
and Kircher (2011) and Lopes de Melo (2009) argue that because of the non-monotonic effect
of firm productivity on wages, an identification strategy based on AKM wage fixed effects
model fails to identify sorting15.
Instead, we apply a simple, alternative measure of worker and firm quality described in
Lopes de Melo (2009). Since higher type workers in searching model obtain higher wages on
average, the average wage of a worker Si =
∑
t∈Ti wit
Ti
recovers the true type of the worker,
where Ti is the set of years that worker i shows in the data. Firm types are measured based
on the quality of workers firm j hires, either the average worker type employed in firm j, i.e.,
Pj =
∑
t∈Tj
∑
i∈Njt Si∑
t∈Tj Njt
or the best worker type employed in firm j, i.e., Pj = maxt∈Tj ,i∈Njt(Si),
15Lopes de Melo (2009) proposes an alternative measure of match quality based on the correlation between
a worker fixed effect and the average fixed effect of her coworkers. Using this measure, Lopes de Melo (2009)
and Bagger and Lentz (2008) find that the correlation is between 0.3 and 0.4, suggesting that sorting plays
an important role in labor market. Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) suggest that the wage dispersion for similar
workers is informative about the degree of matching.
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where Njt is the set of workers employed in firm j at time t, Tj is the set of years that firm
j shows in the dataset. The rank correlation between Si and Pj , Corr(Si, Pj), measures the
strength of sorting. This measure overestimates the degree of sorting in the economy because
of the rent-sharing between firms and workers. However, as the number of years goes to
infinity it converges to the true sorting correlation. If this upward bias is not affected by
the size of labor market, we obtain the correct difference in match quality across regions of
different size. In the empirical analysis, the strength of sorting is constructed using firms with
at least 3 employees.
4.2 Empirical Specification
The match quality depends not only on the size of the local labor market but also on the size
of the labor market in neighboring areas. The large local labor market improves the quality
of match for both low- and high-skilled workers. Large neighboring area improves the match
quality for high-skilled workers, however, it diminishes the quality of match for low-skilled
workers. To examine the above theoretical implications, we use the following specifications:
Corri∈r(Si, Pj)H = α0 + α1ln(pop) + α2ln(pop of neighboring areas) + γX + rH (15)
Corri∈r(Si, Pj)L = β0 + β1ln(pop) + β2ln(pop of neighboring areas) + γX + rL (16)
where Corri∈r(Si, Pj)H denotes the rank correlation (match quality) between types of high-
skilled workers and the corresponding firm types. Corri∈r(Si, Pj)L is the match quality for
low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers are defined as the workers above the 75th percentile
of skill distribution, i.e., an average wage larger than 121.50 Euro. Low-skilled workers are the
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workers below the 25th percentile of skill distribution, i.e., an average wage lower than 81.74
Euro. ln(pop) is the log population of local municipality, while ln(pop of neighboring areas)
is the log population of neighboring areas. α1, α2, β1, and β2 are the coefficients of interest.
X refers to a vector of control variables, for example, average firm size, average house price
etc.
Neighboring areas are constructed in terms of distance and commuting time. By mapping
NIS-code with geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude), we are able to calculate the
straight-line distances between each NIS-code and construct circles of radius r around the
geographic centroid of each NIS-code. Population of local region is defined as the number
of workers living in the local municipality. In the dataset, 73.76% workers commute within
a 50km radius around the location of residence. So the population of neighboring areas is
defined as the number of workers living within a 50km radius around the municipality of
residence (exclude the population of own municipality). We also construct neighboring areas
based on travel time of commuting (by car or by train), for example, regions that can be
reached via auto-highway within 60 minutes16.
We rely on OLS results to test the implications of the model. On one hand, the population
at municipality level in Belgium is not likely to change substantially over time. On the other
hand, the number of firms in a region does not response to the change in the population
immediately.
16In the dataset, 84.79% workers commute to regions that can be reached via auto-highway within 60 minutes
from the municipality of residence.
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Figure 11: Population and Match Quality at Municipality level (2000)
5 Results
To get some feel for the spatial structure, maps of Belgium are shown in Figure 11. Particu-
larly, Figure 11 shows considerable spatial variation in labor market size and match quality.
The darkest areas reflect the densest labor market or the highest match quality.
5.1 Commuting Rate, Number of Firms and Size of Labor market
First, we show some scatter plots to illustrate the basic intuitions of our model. The model
predicts that, ceteris paribus, workers living in small regions are more likely to commute
to other regions for the high job search efficiency, moreover, the commuting rate is higher
for regions which have denser neighboring areas. The two scatter plots in Figure 12 show
a negative correlation between the commuting rate and the log population of local region
and a positive correlation between the commuting rate and the log population of neighboring
areas17.
17Commuting rate is defined as the ratio of the number of commuters (whose place of work is different from
her place of residence) to the total number of workers at municipality level.
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Figure 12: Commuting Rate and Size of Labor Market A. Log Population of Local
Market (slope=-0.071, s.e.=0.002) B. Log Population of Neighboring Areas (slope=0.072,
s.e.=0.0017).
Figure 13: Number of Firms and Size of Labor Market A. Log Population of Local Market
(slope=1.12, s.e.=0.0087) B. Log Population of Neighboring Areas (slope=-0.20, s.e.=0.0072).
Turning to the number of firms and the size of labor market, the left panel of Figure 13
indicates that the log number of firms at municipality level is strongly positively correlated
with the log population of local region. However, the right panel of Figure 13 suggests
that, other things being equal, the number of firms is smaller for regions which have denser
neighboring areas.
Figure 12 and 13 provide us a general picture of the intuition underlying the model in
Section 2. Workers living in a region being close to dense neighboring areas are more likely
to commute, which leads to a decrease in the job openings in the local region.
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5.2 Match Quality and Size of Labor Market
We measure skill and productivity with wage data. The rank correlation between skill and
productivity measures the match quality. The average match quality for high-skilled workers
is 0.24, while the average match quality for low-skilled workers is 0.4418. Firm types can be
measured by the average worker type it hires or the best worker type it hires. We report
the results using these two measures in Table 2 and 3, respectively. The first four columns
in Table 2 show the results for high-skilled workers. The impact of the size of neighboring
areas on the match quality for high-skilled workers is larger than the impact of the size of
local market. In particular, the size of neighboring areas has a significantly positive effect on
the match quality of high-skilled workers. However, the coefficient of the size of local market
is small and insignificant. The results in column (3) and (4) show that the estimates of the
coefficient of log population of neighboring areas are not much affected by the inclusion of the
additional controls. The last four columns in Table 2 shows the results for low-skilled workers,
suggesting that the impacts of the size of local region and the size of neighboring areas are
of comparable magnitude. The size of local market has a significantly positive effect on the
match quality of low-skilled workers while the size of neighboring areas has a significantly
negative effect on the match quality of low-skilled workers. Interestingly, the match quality of
high-skilled workers is significantly lower in regions along the language border, as the language
border inhabits high-skilled workers from benefiting from dense neighboring areas, whereas,
the match quality of low-skilled workers is not significantly affected by the language border.
The results in Table 3 show that the main results do not change by using an alternative
measure of firm types, that is the best worker type a firm hires.
18Firm types are measured by the average worker type a firm hires.
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Table 4 presents the results of two robustness checks. Brussels, which hosts the head-
quarters of the European Union, is the largest urban area in Belgium. The results reported
in Table 2 and 3 may be driven by Brussels-effect. As a robustness check, we present the
results in Table 4 excluding 19 municipalities in the Brussels-Capital region in the dataset.
The results are robust to excluding Brussels-Capital region.
We only have matched worker-firm data, in which we are not able to identify the direct
links between workers and establishments. In the dataset, around 3% firms are multi-plant
firms, employing about 1/3 of employees. In order to capture the direct links between workers
and establishments, we use the subsample of workers working in single-plant firms to construct
rank correlations. The last four columns in Table 4 show the results and the results do not
change.
We also measure the size of labor market by density. The results are presented in Table
6 in Appendix C, suggesting that the main results hold. In Appendix D, we present the
results using alternative measures of neighboring areas which are constructed in terms of
commuting time. The results using neighboring areas based on the travel time of commuting
by car are consistent with the implications of our model, whereas the results using neighboring
areas based on the travel time of commuting by train show that the coefficient of the size of
neighboring areas is positive but insignificant for high-skilled workers. One possible reason
would be that high-skilled workers are likely to commute by car and thus their commuting
destination areas are not restricted to the availability of trains between two municipalities.
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6 Conclusion
We have proposed a model with a continuum of job and worker types, complementarities in
production, search frictions and free entry, allowing for inter-regional labor mobility. The
interaction of increasing returns to scale in job search and labor mobility costs gives rise to
a series of new features. The large labor market improves the quality of the match between
firms and workers. Because of the presence of labor mobility costs, only high-skilled workers
are able to migrate or commute to the large cities, whereas low-skilled workers continue to
search jobs in the local region. The outflow of high-skilled workers leads to a decease in the job
openings in the local region. Our model shows the above self selection mechanism. It further
shows that high-skilled workers in a region benefit from being close to dense neighboring areas,
since they are able to benefit from the scale effect from the neighboring areas which leads to
an increase in the strength of assortative matching. However, because of the decline in job
openings in the local region, left-behind low-skilled workers suffer from being close to dense
neighboring areas. Our results suggest that a policy which aims to increase inter-regional job
search efficiency or decrease labor mobility costs, for example, provide subsidies to commuters,
may harm low-skilled workers in small towns.
We find empirical support for our theory using a unique Belgian linked employer-employee
dataset. Our measures of skill and productivity derive directly from wages which incorporate
unobservable characteristics of skill and productivity. High-skilled workers are more likely
to commute. Regions which have denser neighboring areas host less firms. The large local
labor market improves the quality of match for all worker types, especially for low-skilled
workers. Large neighboring area improves the match quality of high-skilled workers, however,
it diminishes the match quality of low-skilled workers.
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A Data Cleaning Process
We start with 35,721,027 observations, each observation corresponds to a worker-firm-year
cell.
All observations with a wage below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile of the
wage distribution are dropped. This leaves us with 34,655,478 observations.
Workers who earn less than a minimum wage (The monthly gross statutory minimum
wage is 1186.31 Euro in Belgium in 2004, which is equivalent to 54 Euro of gross daily wage)
are dropped. This leaves us with 33,894,307 observations.
We restrict the sample to private sectors. The sectors are defined based on the NACE 2003
classification, so firms operating in a 2-digit NACE sector above 74 are dropped. This leaves us
with 20,390,188 observations. We also discard observations living in the neighboring countries,
for instance, Netherlands and France. This procedure yields 20,126,230 observations.
B Percentiles of Average Wage Distribution
C Population or Density
D Different Measures of Neighboring Areas
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Table 5: Percentiles of Average Wage Distribution
Percentile Worker Effect
10 70.86
20 78.17
30 85.09
40 91.44
50 97.37
60 104.34
70 114.59
80 129.86
90 157.60
Note: Worker effect is measured
by the average full time equiva-
lent gross daily wage of workers.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Table 6: Population or Density?
Average Worker Type Best Worker Type
High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
ln(emp./sq.km.) -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0047 0.0028∗∗ 0.0024 -0.0096∗∗∗ -0.0096∗∗ 0.0030∗∗ 0.0056∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0039) (0.0012) (0.0028)
ln(emp./sq.km. in neighboring areas) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.0037∗ -0.0081∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0074) (0.0021) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0085) (0.0023) (0.0049)
language border dummy -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.0034 -0.0047 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ 0.0050 0.0065
(0.0029) (0.0083) (0.0025) (0.0061) (0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0030) (0.0072)
average firm size 0.000018 -0.00068∗∗ -0.00071∗∗∗ -0.00031 0.00051∗∗∗ 0.00017 -0.000064 -0.00020
(0.00015) (0.00031) (0.00012) (0.00024) (0.00015) (0.00030) (0.00012) (0.00028)
average age of workers 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0046∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0016 0.0020∗ -0.00033
(0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0012) (0.0028)
ln(house price) -0.019∗∗ -0.0062 -0.0013 0.0067 0.0053 -0.00045 0.010∗∗∗ 0.0069
(0.0092) (0.0058) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.011) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0044)
job switch rate 0.30∗∗∗ 0.058 -0.28∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ 0.25∗∗ -0.099 -0.19∗∗∗ -0.095∗
(0.095) (0.052) (0.059) (0.047) (0.11) (0.091) (0.068) (0.051)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879
R-squared 0.039 0.032 0.13 0.12 0.032 0.024 0.054 0.051
Note: Unit is municipality. The dependent variable is match quality measured by the rank correlation between worker and firm types. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. House price is measured by the weighted average price of house,
villa, apartment and lot. Herstappe, the least populous municipality in Belgium, is dropped.
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